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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is a divorce case with issues of custody and spousal maintenance. The

Petitioner, Mark Aaron Franklin ("Mark"), filed this case to be divorced from the Respondent,
Sydney Kristen Franklin ("Sydney"), and to gain primary custody of the parties' children.
Sydney countersued Mark for primary custody of the children and requested spousal
maintenance. All issues of property and debt were resolved prior to trial. The Magistrate Court,
Judge Andrew Woolf, awarded Mark primary custody and denied Sydney's claims for spousal
maintenance. Sydney appeals that decision.

B.

Course of Proceedings
Mark filed his Petition for Divorce Judgment on December 18, 2017. R. Vol. 1,

p. 15. Sydney filed Respondent's Response and Counterclaim on January 8, 2018, R. Vol. 1, p.
30. Mark filed his Reply to Counterpetition on January 10, 2018. R. Vol. 1, p. 38. Sydney later
modified her pleading when she filed her Amended Response and Counterpetition on January 18,
2018. R. Vol. 1, p. 46.
On March 14, 2018, Sydney filed her Motion for Temporary Orders, requesting
that she be awarded primary custody. Mark responded to that Motion on March 22, 2018 with
his own affidavit. On March 29, 2018, the Magistrate Court heard arguments on that Motion.
The Court entered its Temporary Orders on May 7, 2018, awarding the parties equal custody of
the children to be shared on a 50/50 basis with the children. R. Vol. 1, p. 67.
Sydney again amended her Counterpetition on July 25, 2018. R. Vol. 1, p. 78.
The parties engaged in mediation and were able to partially mediate their case.
The Court's Partial Judgment entered November 29, 2018.
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Trial was held on November 1st and 2 nd , 2018. The Magistrate Judge requested
that the parties file their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which they filed on
November 30, 2018. The Magistrate entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw on
January 22, 2019. R. Vol. 3, p. 472.
Sydney filed a Motion to Reconsider/Motion to Re-Open Evidence/Motion for
New Trial on February 4, 2019. R. Vol. 3, p. 484. Mark then filed his Objection to Motion to
Reconsider/Motion to Re-Open Evidence/Motion for New Trial on March 4, 2019. R. Vol. 3, p.
521. The Court heard oral argument on that Motion on March 8, 2019 and denied it when it
entered the Order on Motion to Reconsider on May 2, 2019. R. Vol. 3, p. 539. The Amended
Final Judgment entered June 5, 2019. R. Vol. 3, p. 542.
Sydney filed this appeal on June 10, 2019. R. Vol. 3, p. 554. The Magistrate
granted her Motion for Permissive Appeal on July 9, 2019.

C.

Statement of Facts
Mark and Sydney were married on July 7, 2008. They were married for about 11

years until they divorced on November 29, 2018. They are the parents of two minor boys.
During their marriage, the parties accumulated various parcels of real property,
personal property, and debts. They were able to agree to the division of those assets in the
divorce. The division of those assets is set forth in the Partial Judgment entered by the
magistrate on November 29, 2018.
When the children were younger, both parties cared for them, with Sydney
providing that care during the day and Mark in the evening. Trial Tr. 32: 15-3 3: 11. During that
time, Mark worked a lot. Trial Tr. 67:7-10. During this time, Sydney was a stay at home mother
until about 2014 when she began to work outside the home. Trial Tr. 214:10-16. As they grew,
Mark spent more and more time with them. Trial Tr. 33:12-22. He also worked less. Trial Tr.
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69:22-70:3. As Mark's time with the boys increased, Sydney's decreased. Trial Tr. 33:23-34:8.
Near the end of the marriage, Mark was primarily responsible for feeding them at night and
providing for their care in the evenings. Trial Tr. 33:23-34:8; 35:10-16. He did this because he
worked all day and Sydney, not working full time, did not have dinner prepared. Trial Tr. 234:7235:4. He also began providing primarily for their medical and dental appointments. Trial Tr.
72:7-74:4. Mark clearly knows his children well and cares for them. Trial Tr. 28:24-29:22;
31:17-32:11.
Mark used marijuana during the marriage, but quit sometime in 2014 or 2015.
Trial Tr. 201: 18-22. He never used marijuana around the children. Trial Tr. 201:23-202:10.
Mark passed two drug tests showing that he was clean from any drugs in his system. Trial Tr.
238:21-239: 17. Sydney also sued marijuana during the marriage, but quit before Mark quit. Trial
Tr. 239:18-24. Sydney also complained that Mark drank too much during the marriage, Trial Tr.
332:13-333:1, but Mark admitted that after separation he only had one or two drinks maybe a
couple of times per week when he has custody of the children. Trial Tr. 241 :3-11. Prior to
separation, Mark admitted that he drank a lot, due to coming home to war zone. Trial Tr. 404: 18405: 11.
Around 2017, the children started attending daycare. Trial Tr. 7 :22-8: 1. When
they did, Sydney would often leave them at the daycare provider when she was otherwise
available to provide for their care. Trial Tr. 36:5-20. During that time, they were cared for by
Helma Blatter, their daycare provider. Trial Tr. 8:9-20. Helma observed that Mark was a real
positive influence in the children's lives. Trial Tr. 9:6-8. She also described Sydney's
interaction as "not as consistent with the boys as Mark was." Trial Tr. 9: 19-22. Mark was better
with discipline and follow through based on her observations. Trial Tr. 10:3-8; 14:24-15:19. He
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is calm and soft-spoken to the children and teaches them to care for their home. Trial Tr. 263: 1022. Sydney on the other hand had difficulty disciplining the boys in a way that was effective to
correct their behavior. Trial Tr. 10:9-21; 13: 10-18. Sydney was "short" with the boys when she
picked them up. Trial Tr. 17: 14-16. In the six months before separation, Mark observed Sydney
get angry and jump on the oldest child a couple of times. Trial Tr. 47:2-12. Juanita Franklin,
Mark's mother, observed Sydney put the oldest child in a headlock while at the Museum of Idaho
a few years prior to trial. Trial Tr. 261:2-262:13. This resulted in them being more emotional
and less cooperative when they were with Sydney and more stable-able to respond well to what
they needed to do-when with Mark. Trial Tr. 11 :24-12:6.
Immediately prior to the parties' separation in September or October of 2017,
Sydney's behavior became more erratic. She failed to care for the parties' home. Trial Tr. 38:540:24. She was also purchasing a lot of items with little to no use. Trial Tr. 45:2-43: 19. At one
point, the house became so cluttered that Mark and the children would have to move items out of
the way. Trial Tr. 44: 14-24. Sydney has epilespsy. Trial Tr. 268:7-11. In the summer of 2017,
she had an episode at Broulim's where she fell over, hit her head, and bleed. She had oldest
child in her care. Trial Tr. 53:10-19. She has anorexia and has ongoing treatment. Trial Tr.
268:20-23. She has ongoing issues with the disease and at times does not properly eat. Trial Tr.
41:5-22; 35:1-9. She became violent with Mark when she was not eating right. Trial Tr. 48:923. Her actions and thinking was also not rational during those times. Trial Tr. 197:17-23. On
one occasion, she threatened him with a firearm. Trial Tr. 48:24-50:3. During this time, Sydney
worked at Dillards part-time and did not arrive home until around 9:30 p.m. Trial Tr. 284: 11-17.
After Mark and Sydney separated on October 24, 2017, they alternated custody of
the children. Trial Tr. 54: 13-24. On at least one occasion, Mark observed Sydney at a local bar
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during the time that she was supposed to have custody of the children. Trial Tr. 62:2-63:7.
Sydney also failed to take care of the yard in the community home during this time such that the
boys could not play outside. Trial Tr. 63:8-64:24. Sydney's failure to properly clean her home
also continued, with very dirty bathrooms, dirty dishes from the previous day, dirty and messy
children's bedrooms, and very dirty general living areas. Trial Tr. 258:5-259:23. Mark was
concerned that Sydney was pawning the children off on other when she was supposed to be
spending time with them, prompting him to continue to seek primary custody. Trial Tr. 215 :21216: 12. During separation, Mark's mother, Juanita Franklin, cared for the children during
Sydney's custodial time on a Monday and a Tuesday until Sydney arrived home at 9:00 p.m.
Trial Tr. 254:8-255:8. She also cared for the children on Sydney's Friday night in September
until Sydney arrived home at 2:00 a.m. Saturday morning. Trial Tr. 259:22-260: 12. On January
22, 2018, Sydney was charged with driving under the influence. Trial Tr. 272:19-273:8; 334:7335:20. During the divorce, the parties' oldest child fell behind in school and neither party knew
it until Sydney was contacted by the child's teacher. Trial Tr. 216: 13-217: 10. Immediately prior
to trial, Sydney was gone for 5 Saturdays in a row from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m., including her
custodial days. During this time, she had her parents care for the children. Trial Tr. 361: 11362: 15.
Mark's work schedule is such that he arrives home about 5:30 p.m. every night.
Sydney, on the other hand, works in Victor, Idaho, leaves around 8:00 a.m. and does not arrive
home until between 8:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Trial Tr. 276:21-277:9; 254:8-255:8.
Mark lives frugally and has a very reasonable budget. R. Vol. 1, p. 152. His
expenses total $3,385.95 per month. Trial Tr. 90: 13-92:20. He desired during the marriage and
desires after the marriage to build wealth. Trial Tr. 89: 18-21. His gross income is $60,000.00 per
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year from the company he owns, Roof Rescue. Trial Tr. 93:17-22. He did spend money at
restaurants and travel for business meals and expenses. Trial Tr. 179:20-182:21.
Sydney claimed a much higher amount as to what she needed, but the parties
lived on around $65,000.00 a year from their income at Roof Rescue. Trial Tr. 143:21-25.
Sydney also overspent during the marriage, spending money on unnecessary and wasteful items.
Trial Tr. 148:22-149:8. She also withdrew large sums of cash during the marriage, which were
unaccounted for by her. Trial Tr. 154:14-155:1 ($4,386.22 in February 2017); Trial Tr. 155:21156:3 ($1,000.00 in April 2017); Trial Tr. 157:3-158:17 ($10,000.00 in August 2017); Trial Tr.
159:22-160:12 ($5,826.00 in August 2017); Trial Tr. 161:11-20 ($3,891.00 in December 2017);
Trial Tr. 163:15-25 ($18,569.95 in December 2017); Trial Tr. 164:1-18 ($400.00 in December
2017); Trial Tr. 170:16-25 ($2,426.69 in June 2018). All told, she removed approximately
$48,000.00 in cash that was unaccounted for. Trial Tr. 166:6-16. Sydney admitted that she had
spent all of the funds she withdrew, even though Mark was paying the majority of her monthly
bills. Trial Tr. 290:18-291:12. When presented with her budget and cross-examined, she
admitted that many of her expenses were over-inflated. Trial Tr. 295-303; 308-316.
Sydney claimed she was subjected to domestic violence and sexual abuse at
Mark's hand during the marriage. That topic is covered in great detail below.
At the entry of the Partial Decree of Divorce, Mark showed that Sydney received
over $500,000.00 in assets compared to the approximately $350,000.00 in assets awarded to him.
R. Vol. 1, p. 151.
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II.

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding Petitioner primary
custody of the minor children.

B.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that Respondent's
allegations of domestic violence were not entitled to any weight.

C.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in replacing the standard of living
established during the marriage with its own opinion as to what Respondent's
standard of living should be in analyzing spousal maintenance.

D.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to award spousal maintenance to
Respondent.

E.

Whether the trial court erred in applying a frivolousness standard instead of
conducting an analysis of the factors required under Idaho Code§§ 32-704 and
32-705 in addressing Respondent's request for attorney fees.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Mark claims his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho

Appellate Rules, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 901 and 908 of the Idaho
Rules of Family Law Procedure, and Idaho Code §§12-107 and 12-121.

IV.

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
1.

Child Custody

Idaho appellate courts review a magistrate's child custody decisions under an
abuse of discretion standard. "The determination of the custody of minor children is commended
to the sound discretion of the trial court; unless such discretion is abused, the court's judgment as
to custody will not be upset on appeal. Osteraas v. Osteraas, 124 Idaho 350, 352, 859 P.2d 948,
950 (1993). Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified the abuse of discretion standard, stating
that it consists of four separate questions which require the appellate court to "evaluate[] whether
the magistrate court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
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outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with relevant legal standards; and (4)
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. Boe v. Boe, 163 Idaho 922, 934, 422 P.3d 1128,
1140 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, No. 45200, 163 Idaho 856, 862, 421 P.3d 187,
193-94, 2018 WL 3150964, at *4 (June 28, 2018).

2.

Spousal Maintenance

A magistrate's decision regarding spousal maintenance is also to be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. "Whether to award spousal maintenance under [I.C. § 32705] is discretionary and requires the court to give due consideration to each party's financial
needs and abilities." Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 861, 303 P.3d 214, 220 (2013) (citing
Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 679, 152 P.3d 544, 550 (2007). The same discretionary

standard set forth in the Boe case, cited above, applies to the review of spousal maintenance.

3.

Attorney Fees
A magistrate's decision of whether to award attorney fees pursuant to

Idaho Code§§ 12-107 and 12-121 is discretionary. "Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's
denial of attorney fees under this provision will be upheld on appeal." McA.ffee v. McA.ffee, 132
Idaho 281, 293, 971 P.2d 734, 746 (Ct. App. 1999). Again, the abuse of discretion standard set
forth in the Boe case applies here.

B.

Sydney Failure to Assign as Error a Lack of Findings in the Magistrate
Court Bars her Ability to Raise that Issue on Appeal
"No party may assign as error the lack of findings unless the party raised such

issue to the trial court by appropriate motion." IDAHO R.

FAMILY LAw P.

802 (2019). "It is well

established that a litigant may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later raise
objections for the first time on appeal. Additionally, substantive issues will not be considered for
the first time on appeal." Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229-30, 220 P.3d 580, 585-86
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(2009) (citing Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179 P.3d 303, 306 (2008)). Thus, any
issues on appeal that the appellant fails to preserve at the trial level are waived on appeal.
In her brief on appeal, Sydney claims that the Magistrate failed to make findings
of fact. See Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9. After trial, Sydney filed a motion requesting that the
magistrate court reconsider its decision, but nowhere in that motion did she claim that the trial
court failed to make specific findings. See M. to Reconsider/M. to Re-Open Evid./M. for New
Trial, R. pp. 484- 494. In fact, in that motion, Sydney relied on several of the magistrate's
findings to support her position.
As Sydney failed to raise the issue of the lack of findings of fact to the magistrate
court, that assignment of error to the trial court should not be considered by this Court on appeal.

C.

The Magistrate Court Properly Made Findings of Fact
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court examines Sydney's claims regarding the lack

of findings of fact, the Magistrate Court properly made findings of fact. Sydney claims that the
Magistrate Court "merely recited five pages of evidence from the record that could be used to
support a finding, without an affirmative statement that the court was finding the facts testified
to." Sydney cites Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839, 847, 405 P.3d 1180, 1188 (2017) to support
this claim. A close examination of this case, when compared to the Searle case, however,
establishes that the magistrate in this case determined facts based on evidence in the record
sufficient to constitute findings of fact.
In Searle, Supreme Court of Idaho stated that the trial court failed to make proper
findings as it only engaged in "an objective recitation of Mother's and Father's testimony." Id.
The Court reasoned that a statement that "'merely recite[ s] portions of the record which could be
used in support of a finding' is not a finding of fact." Searle v. Searle, 162 Idaho 839,846,405
P.3d 1180, 1187 (2017), reh'g dismissed (Dec. 5, 2017) (citing Crown Point Dev., Inc. v. City of
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 9

Sun Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77, 156 P.3d 573, 578 (2007)). It follows that when a Court takes

testimony from the record and fuses that testimony with its own conclusions of that testimony, a
finding is born. In the case at bar, the trial court did fuse testimony with his own reasoning,
forming many findings of fact. That fusion occurs throughout the findings portion of the Court's
Findings and Conclusions, R. pp. 472--483, with the following specific examples:
•

Mark struggled to bond with the children in their early years. R. p. 4 72.

•

Mark has now bonded with the children. Mark and Sydney have good
relationship with the children and care for the children equally. R. p. 472.

•

There were rough patches in the marriage. Mark drank too much, Sydney
was jealous. They both antagonized each other at different points. R. p.
473.

•

Since the parties' separation, Mark doesn't drink as much and Sydney is in
the recovery phase of her eating disorder. Id.

•

Mark's work schedule would allow him to be with the children on a more
consistent basis than Sydney's would. Mark works for himself so he is
more available than Sydney if an emergency came up. Mark also works
mainly in Bonneville County while Sydney works in Victor.

These examples show that the magistrate court did not just "objectively recite" the
parties' testimony, but rather analyzed that testimony and determined the facts upon which it
relied in forming its conclusions of law.
For those findings of which it could be concluded that they were simply
"recitations" of testimony, the burden is on the Appellant to show that they were contested,
refuted, or would result in some change to the outcome of the case. A trial court shall "set forth
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the findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon .... " IDAHO R. FAMILY LAw P. 801 (2019).
The equivalent of this rule is Rule 52(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, of which it has
been stated: "The purpose of this rule is to 'afford the appellate court a clear understanding of the
basis of the trial court's decision, so that it might be determined whether the trial court applied
the proper law to the appropriate facts in reaching its ultimate judgment in the case.' Only where
the basis of the court's ruling clearly appears from the record may this requirement of specific
findings be disregarded by the appellate courts. Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 565, 944
P.2d 695, 700 (1997) (citing Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988,
996 (1982). In this case, Sydney challenges every factual finding of the trial court. She does so
without specifying whether that specific finding was contested or subject to multiple
interpretations by the trial court, necessitating weighing the facts before arriving at a factual
conclusion. A review of the Findings and Conclusions affords this Court a clear understanding
of the basis of the trial court's decision and shows how the Magistrate applied the proper law to
the facts to reach its judgment.

D.

The Magistrate Court Properly Weighed the Evidence of Domestic Violence
and in His Discretion Gave it Little Weight
Rule 801 of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure states: "Findings of fact

will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In the application of this principle regarding shall
be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of those witnesses
who appear personally before it."
A trial court acts within its discretion when it makes a custody award based on
evidence that is sufficient to conclude that the award is in the child's best interest.
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375, 378 (2007). A magistrate's
findings of fact, however, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial and
competent evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 56,
44 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2002). Evidence is substantial "if a reasonable trier of fact
would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has
been proven." King v. King, 137 Idaho 438, 442, 50 P.3d 453, 457 (2002). When
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reviewing a magistrate's findings of fact, we view the evidence in favor of the
magistrate's judgment and will uphold the magistrate's findings even if there is
conflicting evidence. Nelson, 144 Idaho at 713, 170 P.3d at 378. We will not make
credibility determinations or replace the trial court's factual findings by reweighing
the evidence. Id.
Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929, 934, 204 P.3d 1140, 1145 (2009). When reviewing a trial court

decision, the focus is "upon the process used by the trial judge in reaching his or her decision,
not the result of that decision .... The trial judge is in a far better position than [an appellate
court] to weigh the demeanor, credibility, and testimony of witnesses and the persuasiveness of
all the evidence . . . . Therefore, we do not weigh evidence." Hudelson v. Delta Intern.
Machinery Corp., 142 Idaho 244, 248, 127 P.3d 147, 151 (2005). The inquiry in these instances

is limited to whether the trial judge abused his discretion. Id.
Judicial discretion "requires an actual exercise of judgment and a consideration of
the facts and circumstances which are necessary to make a sound, fair, and just determination ...
we have long held that the appellate court should not substitute its discretion for that of the trial
court." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 772, 727 P.2d 1187, 1200 (1986). In reviewing the trial
court's decisions for abuse of discretion, the appellate court "must ascertain whether the trial
judge has given 'due consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, and correctly
applied the law thereto."' O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 813, 810 P.2d 1081, 1099 (1990).
In this case, Sydney claims that the Magistrate Judge did not properly weight the
evidence of Sydney's claim that Mark raped and emotionally abused her. Sydney cites various
portions of the record, including statements made by Mark where he denied the claims of rape
and accused Sydney of lying. The Magistrate Judge weighed that conflicting evidence, as his is
province, and essentially found that Sydney's claims lacked credibility. He stated: "Sydney
claims that Mark raped her. She did not identify that in her discovery responses. She did not call
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the police. The first time the Court was aware is when she brought this up at trial. The Court
does not put much weight to this allegation." R. p. 479.
Sydney goes on to cite factual statements from case law to support her assertion
that individuals often don't report domestic violence to law enforcement-statements akin to
expert witness testimony that should have been presented at trial. These claims are used to
bolster her position as to why she would not report the claims of marital rape prior to trial.
Appellant's Brief, p. 11-12. This new evidence was not present for the trial court to consider, is
therefore a new issue, and cannot be reviewed in this appeal. See Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho
224, 229-30, 220 P.3d 580, 585-86 (2009) ("It is well established that a litigant may not remain
silent as to claimed error during a trial and later raise objections for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, substantive issues will not be considered for the first time on appeal").
It is important to recognize the timing of Sydney's testimony regarding the

alleged marital rape and emotional abuse. It was provided at the conclusion of trial. This case
began December 18, 2017 with Mark's filing of the Petition for Divorce Judgment. Trial was
held on November 1 and 2, 2018. In no document or other statement made prior to trial did
Sydney make any claims that Mark raped her or did any other sexual acts to her against her will.
She testified that she never called the police. Trial Tr. 370:20-24. As to the actual claim of
marital rape, during cross examination, she alleged that she was in a dead sleep in bed when
Mark came home, climbed on the bed, and she woke to Mark grabbing her, forcing her chin
back, and forcing his penis down her throat. Trial Tr. 371: 10-16. This statement was different
than what she had told her attorney on direct examination: "The manner in which he woke me up
was by shoving his penis so hard and far down my throat that I couldn't breathe." Trial Tr.
336: 17-337: 1. Her cross-examination statement differs from her direct examination statement in
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that she didn't state in her direct that Mark grabbed her and forced her chin back before allegedly
forcing his penis down her throat. Somehow, according to Sydney, Mark was able to position
himself on the bed such that he could shove his erect penis down her throat. The logistics of the
alleged rape are simply unbelievable and the magistrate so found. The timing of the presentation
of that evidence was apparent to the Magistrate in weighing Sydney's credibility as to these
claims.
Contrary to her argument, Sydney did have a discovery requirement to disclose
claims of domestic violence prior to trial. Sydney was specifically asked: "What, if any,
concerns do you have about the other parent's parenting skills." Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p. 160 (Interrog.
# 9). Her response did not include any allegations of Mark's violence, propensity of violence, or

any claim whatsoever. Id. When asked to list every reason as to why she should be awarded
primary custody, her response was "See Response to Interrogatory No. 9 above." Ex. Rec. Vol.
2, p. 214 (Interrog. # 35). As stated, there is nothing in her response to Interrogatory No. 9 that
includes any allegation of domestic violence.
Mark's response to Sydney's new allegations regarding marital rape and domestic
violence are also clearly in the record. He testified that he never beat her, hit her, or smacked
her. Trial Tr. 407: 11-13. He testified that Sydney's claims of sexual abuse did not happen.
Trial Tr. 407:14-17. Sydney admitted to Mark that "she just hurt so bad that she has to lie about
the things that happened to her so other people know how bad she hurts." Trial Tr. 409:4-8.
Occasionally, she would apologize to Mark for her lies. Trial Tr. 409:9-15. A month after the
alleged rape, Sydney posted on Facebook: "Whenever my husband hurt me or upset me or what I
perceived as such, I retaliated by attacking him, trying to make him understand and feel my
pain." Trial Tr. 411:22-24.
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Here, the magistrate judge properly performed the judicial role of weighing the
credibility of evidence and making factual determinations. Among the evidence considered by
the magistrate judge was an unsupported allegation of domestic violence against Mark. After
hearing Sydney's testimony, observing her demeanor, and weighing her credibility, the judge
decided not to give the allegation much weight. It is apparent that the magistrate judge has
engaged in a fact-intensive process of weighing evidence while applying the proper legal
standard. Accordingly, Sydney's claims of domestic violence must not be disturbed on appeal
because there was no abuse of discretion.
Similarly, the judge scrutinized Sydney's alleged expenses when performing the
standard of living analysis, considering the facts and circumstances, and ultimately concluding
that some of the proposed amounts were unreasonable. With both of these issues raised on
appeal, the issue concerns whether the judge abused his discretion in weighing the evidence.
Accordingly, the domestic violence and proposed expense determinations must not be disturbed
on appeal because there was no abuse of discretion.

E.

The Magistrate Court Properly Awarded Primary Custody to Mark
Awarding Mark primary custody of the children was not an abuse of discretion.

Idaho case law is clear: "Child custody determinations are committed to the sound discretion of
the magistrate judge." Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,453, 197 P.3d 310,314 (2008). IDAHO
CODE § 32-717 provides the proper standard for such determinations, specifying that a "court
may, before and after judgment, give such direction for the custody, care and education of the
children ... as may seem necessary and proper in the best interests of the children." This statute
"gives trial courts wide discretion in making custody determinations, but it requires them to
consider all relevant factors when evaluating the best interest of the child." Bartosz, 146 Idaho at
454, 197 P.3d at 315. The magistrate judge's custody determination "will be upheld ifit is not
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an abuse of discretion and is supported by substantial and competent evidence." Id. at 458, 197
P.3d at 319.
For this Court to overturn the Magistrate's Decision, it must determine that he
abused his discretion. That analysis is whether the magistrate court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted
consistently with relevant legal standards; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

Boe v. Boe, 163 Idaho 922, 934, 422 P.3d 1128, 1140 (2018).
First, the magistrate properly perceived the issue of custody as a discretionary
decision as he analyzed all of the factors set forth in Idaho Code § 32-717, specifically applying
his findings of fact to those factors. In doing so, he recognized that his decision was being made
based on his reasoning and application, not on a bright-line objective standard that required a
specific outcome.
Second, the magistrate further acted within the outer bounds of discretion. He
awarded primary custody of the children to their father after applying all of the facts to the best
interest standard set forth in Idaho Code § 32-717.
Third, the magistrate acted consistently with relevant legal standards by applying
Idaho Code § 32-717. Sydney claims that the magistrate failed to properly apply Idaho Code §
32-717 by (1) weighing one factor more than another, (2) improperly weighing the character and
circumstances of the parties, (3) improperly concluding that Mark is better able to provide for the
children's continuity and stability, and (4) failing to determine that Sydney was a victim of
domestic violence. These claims are addressed in order below as a subset of this section of the
abuse of discretion standard.
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Finally, the Magistrate reached his decision by an exercise of reason.

The Court

correctly perceived this issue as a discretionary decision. The magistrate judge conducted a
thorough analysis of all seven factors listed in Idaho Code § 32-717, weighing the evidence and
making conclusions. As such, the Magistrate's award of primary custody to Mark is supported
by substantial and competent evidence and must not be disturbed on appeal.
1.

The Magistrate Properly Weighed All Best Interest Factors

Sydney claims that the Magistrate did not act consistently with the best interests
of the child standard set forth in Idaho Code § 32-717, and therefore abused his discretion by
improperly weighing one factor above all others. That factor was Sydney's out-of-town
employment. She claims that the Magistrate over considered this factor as it was "one
temporary, irrelevant fact." Appellant's Brief, p. 16. That fact was Sydney's employment at the
time of trial. Sydney goes on to claim that her employment circumstances changed "prior to
final judgment."
Sydney cannot claim that this "one factor" was irrelevant, as a trial court can only
consider "information in existence at the time of trial but not discoverable with due diligence."

Sweet v. Foreman, 159 Idaho 761, 367 P.3d 156, 162 (2016). The only fact the Magistrate had
regarding Sydney's work schedule at the time of trial was the fact that she worked in Victor,
Idaho, 1.5 hours away from her home in Idaho Falls. She further claims that her work schedule
is only relevant if it is "shown to affect the well-being of the children." Silva v. Silva, 142 Idaho
900, 906, 136 P.3d 371, 377 (Ct. App. 2006). This Court has held previously that work
schedules that "substantially limit [a parent's] ability to care for and spend time with the children
on work days" is an important fact for the trial court to consider. Markwood v. Markwood, 152
Idaho 756, 762, 274 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Ct. App. 2012). The Magistrate Court in this case
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examined Sydney's work schedule and determined that it would limit her ability to care for the
children compared to Mark's work schedule.
The Silva case, cited by Sydney in her brief, is very similar in facts to the case at
bar. In that case, the trial court held that Mother should be awarded primary custody of the
children due to father's work schedule-even though in the absence of this one factor, all other
factors regarding child custody tipped slightly in father's favor. Id. at 908, 136 P.3d at 378. The
district court affirmed the magistrate court and this Court affirmed the district court, stating:
Given this wide-ranging inquiry, we cannot say that trial court overemphasized the
issue regarding the work schedules. The error in Moye [Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho
170, 171, 627 P.2d 799, 800 (1981)] was not that the trial court improperly
determined that one factor was entitled to greater weight or importance above
others that it had considered, but rather that the court had barely considered other
relevant factors at all. Although the trial court in this case gave the work schedule
factor great weight, the court also considered other relevant factors, and Rudy has
not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the evidence that
bore upon the custody issue.
Id. This case is substantially the same as the analysis in Silva. In this case, the Magistrate

discussed the relationship of the children with each parent and determined that both parents have
good relationships with the children. R. p. 4 77. The Magistrate determined that both parties live
in Idaho Falls and will continue to do so, where the children live and are in school and daycare.
Id. The Magistrate weighed the parties' character and circumstances specifically and determined

that due to Sydney's work schedule, that she is gone from 8:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. and
commutes roughly 3 hours per day for work. Mark works locally and is home at 5:00 p.m. The
Court weighed that factor in favor of Mark. The Magistrate determined that due to Sydney being
gone for 11 hours per day during the week, it would be difficult for her to get home to take care
of the children, and therefore they would be more stable and have greater continuity in Mark's
care. The Magistrate weighed that factor in Mark's favor. Finally, the Court did not weigh
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domestic violence in favor of either party. Thus, like the analysis in Silva, the Magistrate in this
case had to give great weight to the parties' work situations as Sydney at the time of trial was
literally not present such that she could care for the children.
Thus, in this case, the Magistrate acted consistently with relevant legal standards
in applying the parties' work schedules to the best interests of the child standard while
considering other relevant factors. That decision should not be disturbed on appeal as it was a
proper use of discretion.

2.

Character and Circumstances of the Parties

Sydney also claims that the Magistrate did not act consistently with the best
interests of the child standard set forth in Idaho Code § 32-71 7, and therefore abused his
discretion by determining that the character and circumstances of the parties weighed in Mark's
favor. Her claim is that due to the work schedule analysis that Mark would be more available in
an emergency, that the Magistrate abused his discretion. Her argument for this is that the
"Magistrate did not cite to any evidence, nor was any presented, to show that the children were
suffering as a result of Sydney's work schedule." Appellant's Brief, P. 18. The standard for
child custody, however, is not "lack of suffering", but rather the best interest of the child. IDAHO
CODE§ 32-717 (2019). The Magistrate, recognizing this, determined that Mark's availability is a
very important fact as to the children's care during the work week. See Markwood v. Markwood,
152 Idaho 756, 762, 274 P.3d 1271, 1277 (Ct. App. 2012). Another uncontroverted fact in the
record is that Sydney was gone for the 5 Saturdays prior to trial from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.
without allowing Mark to spend time with the children. Trial Tr. 361: 11-362:25. The trial court
properly weighed this factor in favor of Mark.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 19

Sydney further claims that because her situation changed after trial, that the Court
should have weighed the fact that she now works locally. A trial court can only consider
"information in existence at the time of trial but not discoverable with due diligence." Sweet v.

Foreman, 159 Idaho 761, 367 P.3d 156, 162 (2016). No evidence was presented or in existence
at the time of trial that Sydney had a job in Idaho Falls. In fact, the Magistrate found that she
was not in Idaho Falls at the time of trial: " ... she works in Victor. Her schedule is that she is
gone from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. She commutes roughly 3 hours a day for work. She is hoping
to find work in Idaho Falls but that has not happened yet." Findings and Conclusions, R. p. 479.
Sydney's reliance on facts that occurred after trial is improper and better suited to a modification
proceeding at the trial court level as this Court cannot examine those facts pursuant to Sweet.
The trial court properly used its discretion in determining that due to the parties'
work schedules, their circumstances were such that Mark would be better able to provide for the
best interests of the children. This decision should not be disturbed on appeal.

3.

Continuity and Stability

Sydney also claims that the Magistrate did not act consistently with the best
interests of the child standard set forth in Idaho Code § 32-71 7, and therefore abused his
discretion by determining that the children's continuity and stability would be best served by
being in Mark's primary care. Appellant's Brief, p. 18-20. Sydney cites to the record,
explaining the historic care of the parties and their respective offers at trial to co-parent.
Conspicuously missing from her analysis, however, was the most important factor in the lives of
the children-the availability of the primary parent to be present to care for them. The
Magistrate clearly found the facts regarding availability to be the most salient regarding this
factor. One simply cannot provide care to a child if she is working 11 hours a day, some 1.5
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hours away from the children. In weighing that factor, the Magistrate properly considered the
parties' history and determined that due to Sydney's work schedule, the children's continuity and
stability would be best served by being in Mark's primary care. That discretionary decision
should not be disturbed on appeal.
4.

Domestic Violence

Sydney now asks this Court to determine that the trial court improperly weighed
the issue of domestic violence. At trial, however, Sydney believed that all of her allegations of
domestic violence related to her as a victim; not to the kids. She admitted that "It won't ever
carry over to the kids .... " Trial Tr. 378:7-13. She later admitted that she only thought that
Mark's wrestling with the children "gets out of hand." Trial Tr. 378:14-17. In her discovery
responses, she did not identify any violence or concerns of violence between Mark and the
children. Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p. 160. Her attempt to now bootstrap the alleged violence against her
into the facts presented at trial regarding the best interests of the children is improper. The judge
determined that there was little information to show how any claimed domestic violence affected
the children and gave it little weight in his decision.
F.

The Magistrate Court Properly Determined the Parties' Standard of Living
in Determining Whether to Award Spousal Maintenance
A court may grant support where the spouse seeking the award has shown that she

(a) lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and (b) is unable to support
herself through employment. Idaho Code§ 32-705(1) (2019). Under subsection (a), "reasonable
needs" accounts for the standard of living established during marriage. Wilson v. Wilson, 131
Idaho 533, 536, 960 P. 2d 1262, 1265 (1998).
Sydney was awarded significant property in the divorce sufficient to provide for
her reasonable needs. She received the following in assets:
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Asset
Cash
3436 Grove Avenue

2438 Oaktrail
1454 E. 16th Street
Other Assets Listed on
Exhibit 6
Total Assets to Sydney

Value to Sydney Source of Evidence
$233,698.50 Trial Tr. 290:6-11
$72,041.66 Trial Tr. 288: 14-24;
Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p.
151
$111,536.61 Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p.
151
$73,152.96 Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p.
151
$15,382.00 Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p.
151
$505,812.70

As is also shown on Exhibit 6, admitted at trial, Sydney received an unequal division of the
community property assets, receiving more than $200,000.00 of the community assets than
Mark. Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p. 151.
Sydney is also able to support herself through employment. She makes $16.00
per hour working for Mr. Garcia Santos. Trial Tr. 286: 14-16. Working full time, she is capable
of making $33,280.00 per year ($16.00 per hour times 40 hours per week times 52 weeks per
year), or $2,773.33 per month. She also has income from the two rental properties awarded her
in the divorce (2438 Oaktrail and 1454 E. 16th Street) that make her approximately $1,000.00 per
month. Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p. 44, 46. Sydney agreed with Mark's assessment of the rental income
from these properties. Trial Tr. 287:3-288:10. Sydney's total income per month is
approximately $3,773.33 per month.
Sydney, in her analysis, fails to include the child support payment that Mark is
required to pay to her, which is a resource to Sydney as it relates to her and the children's
reasonable needs. All resources should be used to determine the income of a party. See
Robinson v. Robinson, 136 Idaho 451, 35 P.3d 268 (2001); Campbell v. Campbell, 120 Idaho

394, 816 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1991). Sydney's budget is based on her and the children when they
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are in her care. The child support she receives each month is $420.29 per month. When added
to her other income, she receives $4,193.62 per month.
To determine if she can support herself, we need to examine Sydney's proposed
budget. Sydney claims that she doesn't follow a budget. Trial Tr. 292:25-293 :4. She claimed
that her expenses were $6,405.00 per month based on her monthly budget set forth in Exhibit 44.
Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p. 9. When challenged as to these expenses on cross-examination, Sydney
admitted that most of them were overinflated and subject to reduction. She stated that she paid
her son $25. 00 to mow her lawn during the summer and paid someone to winterize her sprinkler
system. That cost was not $130.00 per month year-round. Assuming it only occurred during the
4 months of summer in southeast Idaho, it would only be on average about $45.00 per month
each year, a reduction of $85.00 per month. Trial Tr. 295: 10-20. She admitted that she pays
"like nothing" for gas utilities over the summer and that during the winter it was about $150.00
per month. Trial Tr. 296:9-20. Ifwe average 8 months of winter at $150.00 per month over a
12-month timeframe, she would only be spending $100.00 per month, which is $100.00 less than
her budget. She admitted that she doesn't change her oil every month at a cost of $80.00 per
month, but rather every couple of months. Trial Tr. 297:21-298:10. That reduction would cut
that cost, on average, to $40.00 per month. She admitted that she doesn't spend $50.00 per
month on a doctor. Trial Tr. 298:24-299: 1. She admitted that her vitamins/prescription costs are
only $40.00 per month, $90.00 less than budgeted. Trial Tr. 299:22-23. She also admitted that
she doesn't pay for any counselors, reducing her budget by another $150.00 per month. Trial Tr.
300:6-24. She admitted that she only spends about $130.00 per month on clothing and dry
cleaning, reducing her budget by $120.00 per month. Trial Tr. 301 :4-302: 1. She stated that she
spends around $390.00 per month on eating out and entertainment. She could not support those
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expenditures with any proof, given that she admitted that she did not spend that on dining out or
entertainment. Trial Tr. 302:2-303:7. She admitted that it was probably only $50.00 per month,
reducing those parts of her budget some $340.00. She admitted that she purchased another dog
after separation, increasing her monthly cost of pet care. Trial Tr. 311:1-3. She admitted that
the cost of her education was $415. 00 total and that amount is not accurate per month as it was a
one-time expense. Trial Tr. 312:9-21. She budgeted $140.00 for camps and extracurriculars for
children, but admitted that there are no reoccurring monthly fees, reducing her budget by
$140.00 per month. Trial Tr. 314:3-7. Finally, Sydney admitted that she did not know the
actual cost of daycare and that it is the combined cost for both children without Mark paying his
portion. As this amount is unknown to her, it cannot be included in her budget-reducing it
$740.00 per month. These reductions, when added up, show that her budget should be reduced
by $2,150.00 per month. Her actual monthly expenses are closer to $4,255.00 per month. She
makes approximately $4,193.62 per month. The delta ofless than $100.00 in her budget is
clearly made up in the community property assets she was awarded in the divorce.
It is also clear from the record that Sydney spent well above her means. This
Court has been clear on that a standard of living need not be maintained if the parties lived
beyond their means. Campbell v. Campbell, 120 Idaho 394, 403-404, 816 P.2d 350, 359-360
(Ct. App. 1991). In January 2018, after Sydney withdrew excessive amounts of money from the
parties' community property checking account, she had approximately $32,000.00 in her
account. Trial Tr. 306:21-307:1. By April 27, 2019, she admitted that she had about $15,000.00
remaining. Trial Tr. 308:1-14. When questioned what happened with the funds, she was unable
to explain where the money was spent. Prior to Sydney's excessive spending, Mark kept a
budget that allowed the parties to accumulate the assets they had to divide during the marriage,
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including the cash reserves of which she spent a large portion. In fact, she admitted that during
the time she overspent all of those funds while Mark was paying the majority of the household
bills. Trial Tr. 290:18-291:12. Sydney's artificial spending does not equate to a standard of
living that they enjoyed during the marriage and there is no proof that she enjoyed that standard
of spending.
Sydney claims that she does not have sufficient property to meet her reasonable
needs based on her budget shortfall and demands that she receive those funds for the next 30
years until retirement age. Sydney is essentially claiming that she is entitled to permanent
maintenance. App. Brief, p. 24.
Sydney, on page 24 of her Appellant's Brief, seems to suggest that she is entitled
to some form of permanent maintenance, based on her argument that her equalization payment
should last the next 30 years until retirement age. That is not the standard of the law in Idaho.
Permanent maintenance awards are reserved for cases where the requesting party is permanently
disabled and that disability prohibits the person from supporting themselves. See Robinson v.
Robinson, 136 Idaho 451, 455, 35 P.3d 268, 272 (2001). Otherwise, only rehabilitative

maintenance, or maintenance which allows sufficient time for the requesting party to make
sufficient income to meet their needs. See id. In any circumstance, "The purpose of a spousal
award and the duration of such an award are matters properly to be decided by the trial court
within its discretion." Id.
The magistrate court applied the proper standard in not awarding spousal
maintenance to Sydney.
The trial judge's denial of spousal maintenance is a discretionary determination,
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and it cannot be disturbed on appeal. In
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determining whether to grant spousal maintenance, the court looks to Idaho Code § 32-705,
which provides the factors for consideration. The spousal maintenance decision "requires the
court to give due consideration to each party's financial needs and abilities." Stewart v. Stewart,
143 Idaho 673, 679, 152 P.3d 544, 550 (2006). The ultimate question becomes "whether the
magistrate judge acted within his discretion consistently with applicable legal principles, and
whether he reached his decision through an exercise ofreason." Id. at 679-80, 152 P.3d 550-51.
In this case, the Magistrate Judge weighed the evidence and applied the proper
legal standard as outlined in Idaho Code § 32-705. Particularized findings were made regarding
Sydney's resources, employment and income opportunities, and monthly expenses. After
considering the evidence, the court concluded that Sydney had sufficient property to provide for
her reasonable needs, and spousal supported was not warranted. An abuse of discretion must be
present to reverse the denial of spousal maintenance, and that did not occur. As the record
shows, the denial of spousal maintenance was determined through an exercise of reason by the
magistrate and should be affirmed on appeal. As the Magistrate properly applied the facts to the
legal standard, he acted within his discretion.
1.

Sydney's Apportionment of Marital Property and Her Income are
Sufficient to Allow Her to Meet Her Needs Independently

As set forth above, Sydney has sufficient assets and income to meet her needs.
The magistrate was aware, as shown in Exhibit 6 that she was awarded more than half of the
community property assets. She has sufficient income from her income, the rental income she
receives, and the child support that she is paid each month to meet her reasonable needs
independently.
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2.

The Time Necessary to Acquire Sufficient Education and Training to
Find Employment

At trial, Sydney failed to present any evidence that she needs time to acquire
education and training for employment. The record established that she is employed and was
just finishing her education to start a new career as a dental assistant. She was unaware of how
much she'd get paid, but indicated that it would be "perfect." Trial Tr. 354:4-16.

3.

The Duration of Sydney's and Mark's Marriage

The parties were married for 10 years. Sydney received over $500,000.00 in
assets for those years. She also received income producing real property.

4.

Sydney's Age and Physical Condition

There was no evidence presented at trial that Sydney's age would affect her
ability to earn an income sufficient to meet her reasonable needs. She has no medical problems
that would affect her ability to meet her reasonable needs through employment. She can work
full time or gain additional education with neither of these factors affecting her.

5.

Tax Consequences

There was no evidence presented or argument made regarding the tax
consequences to either party.

6.

Fault

The determination of fault on the grounds of irreconcilable difference was clear
from the record. The parties did not get along. They fought constantly and were always verbally
jabbing each other. The parties agreed to be divorced on the grounds of irreconcilable
differences. The magistrate said it best when he tersely stated "They both antagonized each
other at different points." R. p. 4 73.
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G.

The Magistrate Properly Required Each Party to Pay Their Own Respective
Attorney Fees
The magistrate judge applied the correct legal standard when denying the request

for attorney fees, which is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Idaho Code § 32-704 permits the
court to award attorney's fees after considering the factors outlined in Idaho Code§ 32-705.
"The decision to award attorney fees is discretionary and absent an abuse of that discretion, a
trial court's grant or denial of attorney fees will not be disturbed on appeal." Hoskinson v.
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 465, 80 P.3d 1049, 1066 (2003). Because the same factors are
considered for both spousal maintenance and requested attorney's fees in divorce litigation, the
trial court is not required to engage in a separate analysis for the issue of attorney's fees when he
has already addressed the § 32-705 factors in analyzing the spousal maintenance award. See, Id.
at 465-66, 80 P.3d 1066-67 (holding that because the same factors are analyzed the analysis for
both factors can be combined because the same evidence required to deny spousal maintenance
is sufficient to support a denial of attorney fees).
Here, the trial judge applied the proper standard in denying the requested attorney
fees. In declaring that Sydney has the ability to pay her own attorney fees, the magistrate judge
referred to the reasons set forth earlier in his analysis. The magistrate judge was not required to
again conduct a full§ 32-705 analysis before denying attorney's fees, as he was entitled to rely
on his previous conclusions regarding those factors. Having previously determined that spousal
maintenance was not warranted, the judge also concluded that attorney's fees were improper
when he stated "Sydney also has the ability to pay her own attorney fees." R. p. 482. In fact, the
ongoing expense of those attorney fees was accounted for in her month budget submitted as
Exhibit 44. Ex. Rec. Vol. 1, p. 9. A denial of attorney fees is an act of discretion reserved to the
trial court judge, and it can only be disturbed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. The
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magistrate in this case applied to proper legal standard after previously considering Sydney's
financial circumstances. The denial of attorney fees should be upheld on appeal.

H.

Mark should be awarded his attorney fees on appeal.
Mark should be granted attorney fees on appeal. Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41

allow a party to affirmatively seek costs and attorney fees on appeal. IDAHO APP. R. 40 and 41
(2019). A basis for attorney fees must be presented in a party's first appellate brief in order to
avoid waiver of a claim for attorney fees. IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2019).
In Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 894 P.2d 775 (Ct.App. 1995), the Idaho
Appellate Court stated as follows:
A request for attorney fees on an appeal to the district court is determined upon the
same standards of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court
and is governed by I.A.R. 41. Griffin v. Griffin, 102 Idaho 858, 642 P.2d 949
(Ct.App.1982). An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. §12-121 and
I.A.R. 41 to the prevailing party. Excel Leasing Co. v. Christensen, 115 Idaho 708,
769 P.2d 585 (Ct.App.1989). Such an award is appropriate when the court is left
with the abiding belief that the appeal has been brought, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Id. at 945.
In Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110 (Ct.App. 1995), the Idaho Appellate
Court stated that"[ c]osts are allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless otherwise
provided by law or order of the Court. I.A.R. 40(a)." Id. at 539.
Mark requests that, should the Court grant his requested relief, the Court award
him costs and attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to Idaho Rules of Family Law
Procedure 901 and 908, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41,
and any other applicable rules or statutes. See IDAHO R. FAMILY LAW. P. 908 (2017), IDAHO R.
CIV. P. 54 (2019); IDAHO APP. R. 40 and 41 (2017). Given the nature of this appeal, the Court
may award Mark his attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-107 and 12-121.
The Idaho Supreme Court "will award fees to a prevailing party under Idaho Code
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section 12-121 when the Court believes 'that the action was pursued, defended, or brought
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Sweet v. Foreman, 159 Idaho 761, 367 P.3d
156, 162 (2016). Furthermore, Idaho Code§ 12-107 provides for an award of costs on appeal to
the prevailing party where a judgment is modified on appeal and recoverable costs include a
party's costs below when the appeal is to the district court.
Based upon the facts of the case, cited statutes and case law, it is clear that
Sydney's appeal simply asks this Court to reweigh evidence already weighed in the trial court's
discretion. This request is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation and warrants an
award of attorney fees to Mark.

V.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
As a result of the foregoing, the magistrate court's decision should be affirmed.

Mark should be awarded his attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED: October 3, 2019.

Krisffiphern. Meek
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA
Attorneys for Petitioner/Respondent Mark A Franklin
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